Kids Today, with their Music and their Haircuts!

During my discussions of fertility, birth rates, population decline, and the future, I have been fairly direct in my conclusions – the future population of the Earth will be smaller and more religious. I have had a surprising number of people counter that religious and political beliefs are not a matter of parentage, but of ideology. As one person stated ‘just because your parents are religious and Conservative doesn’t mean you will be’. Granted, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that some people from religious homes grow up to be atheists. And some people raised atheists become religious.

Statistically, however, the children of parents with ‘identifiable beliefs’ (i.e., they have an opinion on politics or religion strong enough to express it) are most likely to share their parents’ beliefs when they reach adulthood. The development of your political and religious outlook, called political socialization and religious socialization respectively, has been studied, especially in the last 25 years or so, and shows that most adults reflect the religious and political attitudes of their parents. The various ‘socialization factors’ that lead to our ideological development include family, school, peer groups, major events, workplace, marriage, etc. By far the most critical factor is the family, especially since the vast majority of political and religious beliefs are developed in childhood. Even the second most influential element, school, pales in comparison, even when attempts are made to directly influence political outlook with concerted school efforts. Indeed, researchers are coming to suspect that the main influence of school is as an environment where children learn the skills needed to promote and defend the beliefs developed at home. Thus, while major changes in life (leaving home for college, entering the military, marriage and parenthood) can cause something called ‘resocialization’, or seemingly-dramatic changes is behavior and outlook, the large majority of adults mirror the political and religious beliefs of their parents. Research also indicates that, for children of Conservatives or Liberals, the majority of those who do not mirror family beliefs become moderates, not members of the opposite extreme.

There is some evidence that Liberals/Mainline Religious families have lower rates of positive socialization (i.e., their kids are more likely to not be Liberals than Conservative children are to not be Conservatives). This seems to be especially true of Mainline Religious families who may have Liberal children, but those children are less likely to be religious. The biggest problem for Mainline Protestants and religious socialization is that Mainline Protestants are usually intermittent church-goers, and thus their children are less likely to be religious.

In brief: Liberals are likely to have Liberals kids and Conservatives are likely to have Conservative kids, but a higher percentage of Conservatives’ kids are like their parents. Devout parents tend to have devout kids, but lukewarm parents tend to have unchurched kids. Got it? OK.

Let us draw some conclusions. Given identical populations and birthrates, over time there would be a tendency of a group to slowly become more Conservative, since Conservatives have a slightly higher positive political socialization. Concurrently the level of religious participation would tend to sort out into devout and unchurched with fewer and fewer ‘sometimes’ attendees.

This leads to the second argument that I tend to hear: ‘If socialization patterns favor Conservatism’, I am asked, ‘why the dominance of Liberal ideas in the 20^th Century?’ The answer to this lies in another element of political socialization – major political events. Let’s skip the potentially-huge discussion of if the Democrats were really Liberal (as we currently use the term) pre-WWII and focus on a few events [This also allows me to skip the discussion of ethnic alignment with political party and its decline, etc.]. The first is the Great Depression. This led to a slight preference towards Democrats because of their support of social welfare programs. This tendency was reversing itself when the next political event came along, Vietnam. Opposition to the draft led many young adults to become Liberals. In both cases, major events led to a slight increase in political socialization towards the Left.

However, even with these major events, and supporting events like Watergate, there was never a dominance of either Democratic Party or Liberal/Leftist influence in America. The nation leaned Right from 1900 to 1930 and even with the landslide Democratic victories in 1930 and 1932 a coalition of Conservative Democrats allied with Republicans regained dominance of both houses of Congress by 1937 and maintained that dominance for almost 40 years. Even the post-Watergate presidential election of 1976 was amazingly close, with less than a 2% difference in the winners. Ronald Reagan’s historic landslides and the Republican Revolution of the ‘90’sshow that even when baby-boomers were in their most politically-active phase that Conservatism was very strong in America, as it remains today.

To put it another way, there was no dominance of Liberal ideas in the 20^th Century. In my opinion, the late 19^th and early- to mid- 20^th Centuries are remarkable for the (relatively limited) levels of success Liberal/Left ideas actually enjoyed.

Besides, the growth of Socialism, Communism, major wars, and political scandals and their cumulative bolstering of the Left all pale in comparison to the effects of demographic shift in the last 40 years.

The facts are clear – Liberals have fewer children than Conservatives. Much more directly, the devoutly religious have many more children than the non-religious, and the impact of religiosity on fertility seems to be growing over time. A study out of Australia illustrates how the impact of this cannot be understated. The study tracked a group of women from age 30 to age 40. It found that 22% were childless, 16% had one child, 35% had two children, 20% had three children, and 7% had more than three children. This means that 27% of the women accounted for more than 50% of the children. When the demographic, economic, and social factors were examined, the researchers found some interesting facts; women who had not cohabitated before marriage were more than 2.5 times more likely to have 3 or more children than women who had; women who had not planned their first child were over 1.5 times as likely to have 3 or more children than women who planned their first child; Catholic women were over 1.5 times more likely to have 3 or more children than non-Catholics. Toss in that starting young and having more than one child before being 28 also increased the chances of a woman have more than 3 kids, and you see a clear pattern - Catholic women who marry young and start having children early are having much more impact on the future than their own numbers indicate.

Using the generic “80% of children share their parents’ political and religious affiliation” (instead of the ‘97% of the children of very devout homeschooling Conservatives share their parents’ values’) that means that about 40% of the next generation will behave in a similar fashion, representing a 50% growth in relative numbers in a single generation. With Australia’s TFR of about 1.6 these political and social impacts will come faster than they will in America with its higher TFR and immigration, but those changes will be reflected in every nation with a negative TFR.

In the end, I stand by my position, which is: the demographic shift we are currently experiencing will lead to population that is increasingly religious and Conservative.

Living a Happier, Healthier Life

Everyone has different goals. Some want to be rock stars, some famous actors. Some people want to win a blue ribbon at the state fair, some want to get rich and retire early. Some want to be politicians, some want a link from Instapundit. But virtually everyone wants to live longer, be healthier, and be happier while they are doing it. So how do we go about living a healthier, happier life?

Turns out there are some simple things we can do. First, get married and stay married. The Center for Health Statistics shows that married people are healthier than unmarried people. Married people are also happier and more financially secure. This comparison was true for people who had never married, were divorced, and even people who were only cohabitating; its not the living together, or even sharing responsibilities and bank accounts, it seems, it’s the fact of being married that matters here.

Another way to improve your life is to be religious. Religion has a demonstrably positive effect on people’s lives, making them statistically healthier and happier. Indeed, some research shows that religious people live 30% longer than the non-religious – all while being healthier and happier, remember!

In fact, some of the biggest boosts to happiness of women in particular are staying at home, having the husband as primary breadwinner, and having a traditional outlook on gender roles.

When you read these articles, please note that the results are the same across races and income levels and that the effects of marriage on financial status start after marriage, not before (i.e., poor people improve their lot after marriage as much as people who were already wealthy when they married).

How else can we improve our happiness? Well, Conservatives are happier than Liberals.

Let’s put this all together, shall we? If you want to maximize your pursuit of happiness, you will be; Married; Parents; Religious; Live Outside an Urban Area; a Stay at Home Wife or her Spouse; Conservative; in the Sunbelt. In other words – traditional religious Conservative nuclear families in the South are (statistically) the happiest.

Who could’ve guessed that?

A World of Artisans: Distributionism as an Economic Third Way

This is the fourth in a series of articles about Distributionism. You can read the earlier pieces here, here and here.

I will attempt to draw the various ideas together to show not just how to encourage Distributionism, but what I think a Distributivist society would look like and some of the effects I think it would have on other societies. To make this as clear as possible I will attempt to do this in a single post, so I apologize in advance for its length.

In the views of Distributivist thinkers (and in my own opinion) Fascism, Communism, Socialism, and laissez-faire Capitalism all result from the same mistake. And that mistake is to misapprehend the goal of economic activity. For laissez-faire Capitalists, the error is thinking that the goal is to maximize profits with the goal of accumulating the greatest possible capital; for Communists the goal is transformation of Mankind into a new sort of person with a different nature; for Fascists the goal is social order and stability; for Socialists the goal is perfect equality of outcome (which they mistake for justice). Belloc and Chesterton point out where these errors can lead, and history has shown them to be pretty accurate. In every case the essential needs of Man are in at least some ways neglected, leading to unhappiness, abuse, and, eventually, tyranny.

The real answer is surprising in its simplicity; the goal of economic activity is the same as the goal of society. The goal is happiness. In ‘The Outline of Sanity ‘Chesterton wrote,
“There is no obligation on us to be richer, or busier, or more efficient, or more productive, or more progressive, or in any way worldlier or wealthier, if it does not make us happier”

We seek happiness in society through friendship, family, the development of character, and the improvement of our fellow man. We seek happiness through economics by acquiring the essentials of stability, the leisure of self-improvement and beauty, and the improvement of our fellow man. As the principle of solidarity points out, society and economics cannot be divorced from one another. This means that we must engage in economics with our neighbors and cannot forget that we are as dependent upon them as they are upon us. The principle of subsidiarity points out that, just as the most important element of society is the smallest and closest (the family), so our economics should look to smaller, closer ventures to maximize happiness.

There can be no true happiness in the absence of security. The first goal of society is security (from outside invaders, from crime, from abuses of rights) and the first goal of economics should be security (from hunger, homelessness, and exploitation). But just as a society that does not need to fear crime is not necessarily fair or open, a society where all are fed is not necessarily just or free. Security is the foundation, not the end, and this must always be kept in mind.

Many Distributionists argue that concentration of capital into the hands of too few people leads to a decline in liberty that can lead to a state resembling slavery for those who lack capital. The proposed solution is to strive to distribute capital as much as possible (hence Distributionism) so that most, if not all, families are capable of self-sufficiency. This leaves a wide range of possibilities; farmers that have enough land to provide for themselves both directly and through the sale of ‘excess’ produce; skilled tradesmen with their own tools and enough skill that they can be either self-employed or find employment both readily available and their jobs portable (such as a carpenter or computer programmer); factory workers who are part-owners of their factory with sufficient equity that they are involved in issues of capital expenditures and share the reqards and risks of production; retail employee/owners who make cooperative purchases of stock, participate in sales, and either lease or co-own their facility.

As you can see, the ideas of self-sufficiency, solidarity, subsidiarity, an aversion to wage slavery, and social justice tend to point along a particular path, one that rejects Communism, Socialism, and Fascism and is opposed to corporate consolidation and monopolies. The result, where as many people as possible are professionals that own all the tools required for their work and deal as directly as possible with each other, could be called a world of artisans.

A world of artisans would nullify the tendencies of industrial and post-industrial nations to slip into authoritarianism, regardless of their ‘flavor’. The economic displacement of both industrialization and the transformation to post-industrialism creates feelings of fear and insecurity amongst many people who are incapable of self-sufficiency do to a lack of personal capital; they need wages to live and are incapable of generating them without access to someone else’s capital. Changes in the structure are coming that means that they are unsure of continuing access to capital. A simple example is a worker at an auto-plant. He cannot make cars himself; he owns none of the tools, materials, or facilities to make cars himself; his skills are specialized to the point that no other employment but car-making affords him the potential of a living wage. As plants are closed or moved, he is (naturally) afraid of losing his home, even of losing his life to hunger.

Capitalist economies will always lead to some level of insecurity; it is their nature. The feelings of fear created by those lacking capital will be utilized by those who desire change. They may be Machiavellian, they may be benign, but someone will harness the insecurities to effect change. If the desire is to do away with the insecurities of Capitalism altogether, the goal of change will be Communism. If the goal is to use the power of the central government to take capital from one group and give it to another to ameliorate insecurity, the goal is Socialism. If the goal is to make Capitalism more efficient in the desire to accelerate economic growth and reduce insecurity through expansion, the goal is laissez-faire Capitalism in its ‘purest’ form. If the goal is to stabilize society while maintaining Capitalism (and the largest Capitalists), the goal is Fascism.

I am aware that some will argue with my definitions, above. These are my own very broadly-brushed opinions, nit an in-depth analysis of political methods other than Distributionism.
Distributionism argues that Communism and Socialism are wrong (and lead to oppression) because they make the mistake of blaming Capitalism. They further argue that Fascisms and ‘invisible handers’ are similarly wrong for blaming people. You cannot reject economics, nor reject people – you must integrate them. This is done by making as many people as possible independent economic actors – in other words, capitalists.

But how do we get there?

As I mentioned in Part II, the shift to Distributionism cannot be coerced or via ‘negative’ means. You cannot seize land from those that have ‘too much’ and give it to those who have ‘too little’; who would decide? Who would enforce such decisions? Both obviously require – a massive, powerful central government, the very antithesis of Distributivist thought. Likewise, imposing higher taxes on people earning ‘too much’ and giving this money to those earning ‘too little’ result in the same formula – injustice enacted by remote, faceless entities. In addition to leading to resentment (from all sides as to what is ‘just’), alienation (of different groups from one another), dependency (of those who gain with no effort), and lawlessness (by those wishing to either avoid being taxed or who wish to profit unjustly) the power of the central government will continue to expand at the expense of local leadership, the family, and the individual.

The path must be positive. Some steps are relatively obvious and even partially in place. Small businesses should be encouraged with tax breaks and loans. Similarly, cooperatives, credit unions, and similar solidarity groups should also receive tax breaks. Microloans to such organizations could be subsidized by government agencies for a strictly limited time to encourage transition. The removal of farm subsidies and their replacement with tax incentives would go a long way toward creating Distributionist farms. Local, regional, state, etc. funding for training, especially in trades and professions, would encourage the creation of more artisans. Laws that encourage guilds should also be created.

And here we come to another key element in early Distributionist thought; the guild. Similar to unions, similar to professional associations, and similar to consortiums, guilds are still unique. The European guilds of the medieval period are, as noted in the link, the source of most modern concepts of intellectual property, business ethics, trade, and social security. The were formed by members of the same or closely-related trades or professions, generally as independent, self-employed artisans and professionals working together for their own greater good. They set standards of education for their members (and prospective members), codes of conduct, quality standards for products, even rules for contents, size of products, etc. Virtually all of them also organized funds and systems to care for the widows and orphans of members, for members no longer able to work due to disability, and the retired/elderly members of the guild.

Historically a number of guilds negotiated exclusive contracts with cities, preventing non-guild members from practicing their professions there. This eventually led to their concentration in such cities and, ultimately, their downfall as they became isolated and hidebound fraternal institutions. Their counterparts outside the cities often refused to join organizations they saw as urban and both were more able to change quickly and, interestingly, were easier prey for large capital concerns who wished to consolidate. Distributionist thought is to learn from history and employ the best of guilds while rejecting their tendencies to become focused on defending exclusive territories and protecting trade secrets. Under this model Guilds are to have an almost dual nature; internal and external. Internally they act like fraternal societies and professional boards/consortiums. They ensure training and performance standards, enforce ethics, provide insurance services for members, manage pensions and trusts, engage in cooperative enterprises with other guilds, etc. Externally, they are almost like a brand. Consumers that deal with members of, for example, the baker’s guild know that they can trust the contents of the baker’s goods, his level of training, the standards of cleanliness of the bakery, his business ethics, etc.

Guilds differ from unions in a very important element – all levels of the profession or trade are in the same organization. While unions tend to pit employee against employer, guilds force them to work together. Since guild members have the skills, tools, and other capital needed to make them ‘portable’ (they can work for themselves or another master of their profession with ease) there is less insecurity on the part of wage earners. Employers within the guild ‘worked their way up’ through the guild and are very clearly aligned with their workers in the joint venture of success for all members of the guild. Since many guilds historically had rules on the election of guild members to local leadership councils and guild assemblies, the voice of the employed has as much weight as the voice of employers in large decisions, as well. The preferred management of Guilds is at the level of individual self-employed worker, then small shops, then a neighborhood, etc. The involvement of workers ensures such things as a living wage, decent social benefits, and a voice in larger decisions. The non-exclusive nature of a guild means that guilds that become corrupt, exclusive, coercive, etc. will simply have their members melt away/ It is almost like the Wobblies, but with the managers and owners involved, too!

More seriously, the Guild system is a microcosm of Distributionism; the line between employer and employee is virtually eliminated since the employee has the means to become self-employed or an employer himself; the organization is founded on the principles of solidarity, subsidiarity, and justice. The goal of guilds is not to erase Capitalism (which was the goal of many early trade unionists), but to embrace it, to take the best of Capitalism and share it through the free actions of voluntary members. At the same time, guilds share the risks and dangers of Capitalism and ameliorate them through acting with and for each other. Their goal is to create a community where the members avoid the excesses of materialism through close association with their peers, a focus on the needs of their community, and a desire to contribute to the society that makes their success possible. These voluntary organizations succeeded not by rejecting Capitalism, but by sharing the Capitalism, the risks and insecurities as much as, or even more than, the rewards. This is an emulation of civilization itself; the protection of society by sharing risks and hardship is the cornerstone of the advance from barbarism. The voluntary sharing of the benefits of security is the cornerstone of a just civilization.

I can almost hear you now,
“Hold it!” you say, “Deep, you aren’t describing Distributionism as a ‘Third Way’, are you?”

No, I’m not. Mainly because I don’t think that it is a third way. Communism has always been a pipe-dream of people whose arguments begin and end with ‘once we change Man’s essential nature…”; Socialism is an argument that concludes “…and thus we will give Man more freedom by carefully controlling him.”; Fascism is an argument that “We know what is best for you!”; Laissez-faire Capitalism is an argument that “Selfish, unjust actions lead to altruistic, just results… eventually.” Distributionism rejects Communism, Socialism, and Fascism as unjust and immoral in their very conceptualization. It also rejects laissez-faire Capitalism as a wrong-headed attempt to separate ends from means. So, in the end, it is not a Third Way, it is simply the acknowledgement that Capitalism is the best known economic system, and that very minor, voluntary controls can prevent Capitalism from becoming a tool for injustice.

Since Distributivist writers and thinkers spend a lot of time explaining what is wrong with the world, and what Distributionism is against, it has been argued that Distributionism is no more than a reaction, a denial, a ‘no’. In short, it is impractical, even evil. The arguments against Distributionism range from ‘it prohibits international trade’ to ‘it cannot compete with huge multinationals’ to ‘it has no political platform for politicians to use in advocating it’. I find the concept that Distributivist are against international trade when virtually all of them point to the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation as an example not only of international trade, but successful competition with huge multinationals. Or that small firms cannot compete with large ones when small ‘mom and pop’ shops have successfully limited WalMart in China and carved out serious market share in America in recent years. I must also confess that I was surprised when Fr. Neuhaus, whom I normally find to have a very informed opinion, dismisses Distributionism as not having anything to which to attach policies or platforms in the political arena. America has; a Small Business Administration that promotes small business; farm co-ops, credit unions, consumer co-ops, and business co-ops like ACE hardware on almost every corner; a history where the Grange movement held strong, if brief, political influence over national politics; a growing concern over the impact of large enterprises like Wal-Mart and Microsoft of the well-being of the average person; and a rather large (and growing) government job training program. With all respect to Fr. Neuhaus, but I suspect his obliviousness to possible political planks supporting Distributionism may have more to do with his own ignorance of Distributionism, politics and American business than any weakness of Distributionist thought.

Indeed, it would be a rather simple matter to craft political positions that would have a broad appeal and promote Distributionism in a non-coercive manner. As I mentioned earlier, tax breaks for small businesses would be well-received by many. Pointing out that the vast majority of new jobs in America are generated by small businesses would go a long way to making it more popular. Tax incentives for co-ops would face similar approval across a broad segment of society, and it would be a simple matter to increase support for credit unions and similar activities. Reduction of levies and tariffs for small business and co-ops would also help. An increase in awareness of the value of trades would be of great benefit, too.

That seems pretty simple, really; the engine of job growth in America (and the world) is small business; tradesmen are critical for small business; co-ops of all sorts are efficient, competitive organizations that provide solid business benefits to their participants. I am not sure what Fr. Neuhaus and his fellow detractors are missing, but these seem easy sells as political positions. Conservatives can focus on tax relief for business owners and job creation, Liberals can focus on job creation and tax relief for students, blue collar workers, and mom & pop shops. Both can appeal to farmers and rural voters by supporting co-ops.

Seems like a win-win to me.


Next time: more on Distributionism, but on a more personal level.

Proud Vanguard of the Resurgent Patriarchy

I am a very traditional Catholic with four children being homeschooled by my stay-at-home wife, who is almost certainly more conservative and traditional than I am. Thus the title of this piece. Continuing my series of articles about demographics, I have another prediction about the future.

Modern progressive liberals are doomed. No, I mean that literally; modern progressive liberals are as doomed as the passenger pigeon, the dodo bird, or the Tasmanian wolf, with a key difference.

They are exterminating themselves.

I have been talking about what I believe to be a crisis in demographics for some time now. I was talking about the benefits of Patriarchy even earlier. As I pointed out in these earlier posts, I think the decline in fertility and the decline of Patriarchy are connected. Well, it turns out I am in good company.

The collapse of births in Europe is still accelerating with 17 European nations burying more people per year than are born (called ‘more coffins than cradles’). Russia alone lost 1.5 million people in a five year span, while maintaining an average of about 2 million abortions per year; thus Russia’s chillingly low TFR of 1.23. The overall European TFR is only about 1.5. In 1985 the overall global TFR was about 4.2. By 1995 the global TFR had dropped to 2.9. Today the global TFR is estimated to be 2.6 (and this may be high). This means that in a single generation (well, 30 years) the average family size for the entire earth dropped from a bit more than 4 children to well less than three children. If a similar transition occurs in another generation, by 2040 the global TFR could hit 1.0. Globally, 40% of the world’s nations are below replacement fertility rates.

When the overall European TFR fell below replacement all that was needed to stabilize the population was a return to a replacement TFR of about 2.15. But that was too long ago. A large proportion of the European population is older and now the number of women of child-bearing age is smaller. Combined with the acceleration in mortality as the elderly population dies off, this means that the TFR needed just to keep the European population where it is right now is 4.0. Based upon population and lifestyle trends, this is very unlikely to happen. As time goes on, the replacement TFR will get higher until, if current trends continue, the European TFR will be about 6.0 perhaps as soon as 2025.

As the population collapses, so will the European economy. An national economy requires workers. The fact that nations provide benefits to non-workers (mainly children and the retired) means that the non-workers need the products of a certain number of active workers for their own support; this is called the ‘dependency ratio’. In 2000 the average European support ratio was 4:1, or about 4 workers for every retiree. In 2050 it will be about 1.5:1. Since Europeans are having so few children, this means the majority of the dependency will be generated by the rapidly growing population of retirees. This is completely unsustainable.

The results of this reduction in the dependency ratio will be less and less money for European social programs such as pensions, universal health care, and education as well as basic spending such as defense and infrastructure. Europenas will be forced to reduce costs and even scrap entire programs. There is some argument that the current growing acceptance of euthanasia in Europe is based on a realization that Europeans may soon no longer be able to afford the elderly. In other words, the failure of the present generation to have children may mean that future generations will euthanize them as ‘too expensive’. Scary thought.

America is a relative ‘bright spot’. With a TFR of about 2.08 and strong immigration (only counting the legal kind) America has an annual population growth rate of about 0.9%, meaning that births in excess of deaths combined with legal immigration add about 800,000 Americans per year at this time. Already the third most populous nation on earth, the U.S. could grow to over 400 million people by 2050.

But fertility rates are not homogeneous; they vary within a population, sometimes greatly. In America, for example, Hispanic women have the highest TFR at about 3 with White women at about 1.85. And the fertility rate of White Americans increased from a mid-‘70’s low of about 1.2. It should be no surprise to learn that religious families have more children than secular families. But the contrasts go deeper; traditional Catholics have more children than even evangelical Protestants. The highest fertility rates in America are among Hasidic Jews, Hutterites, the Amish, Mennonites, and “Latin Mass” Catholics where they approach 4.6!

Urbanization is seen as a major cause of reductions in fertility, but urbanization does not seem to affect Hasidim or traditional Catholics; the majority of both groups are urban-dwellers, yet they have the same high TFRs as the almost exclusively rural Hutterites, Amish, and Mennonites. Although this might imply that rural Hasidim and traditional Catholics might have TFRs approaching 6.0.

Another element that reduces fertility may be a surprise: public schooling. Demographer John Caldwell noted that the spread of government-mandated public schooling was accompanied by a decrease in fertility. In some cases, this could be tracked county by county. His research shows that each additional month added to the public school year reduces the TFR of children who attend by .23. As one reviewr put it, Caldwell demonstrates that public schools “eat children”.

It should be no surprise that homeschoolers have higher fertility, regardless of their level of religious belief or particular creed. A survey of homseschoolers found striking differences; 62% of American homeschoolers have 3 children as opposed to less than 11% in the general population. And the real difference is in large families; in the general population only 5% of American families have four or more children, while 33.5% of homeschoolers have four or more children. This means that in a nation where the average number of children in 2, over 95% of homeschoolers have 3 or more kids. That is a radical difference, and if Caldwell is right the children raised by homeschoolers will be more fertile than their parents.

To extrapolate a little (i.e., guess), this could indicate that ‘Latin Mass’ Catholic homeschoolers may have a TFR of about 6.o right now. Since I am, effectively, a ‘Latin Mass’ homeschooler who knows a lot of fellow ‘Latin Mass’ homeschoolers, my guess is based on experience.

But where is this taking us? Well, we can assume that global TFRs will continue to decline. Also, we can assume secular urban liberal families that attended public school will continue to have the lowest and most sharply declining TFRs. It is estimated that the “basement”, or lowest possible, TFR is .72, which means that about 70 percent of women have one child while about 30 percent are permanently childless. While this may sound absurdly low, TFRs of .77 have been seen in eastern Germany and a province of Italy. The TFR of Hong Kong is only .89. I believe that TFRs below 1.5 will be seen in the large cities of the American east and west coasts (“blue states” have lower fertility than “red states”) and San Francisco may dip below 1.0. Europe may well free-fall into TFRs below .90

While this occurs the religious communities of the West will increase their TFRs, mainly because of an increase in per capita GDP associated with the initial stages of population decline. Combined with the increased fertility of adults who were homeschooled, the result will be a surge in religious conservatives throughout the West, especially in America. They will largely embrace tradition concepts of family, work, and government and will likely be more conservative than their parents. The population implosion will cause large economic disruptions, movements of people, and changes in government. But the largest effect will probably be a continued increase in TFRs as more and more people realize that children are inherently valuable.

I am far from alone in making these predictions. Phillip Longman wrote an article about these very ideas called “The Return of the Patriarchy” where he argues that the ‘birth dearth’ will shatter liberal welfare systems, eliminate Liberals through sheer childlessness, and result in a return to traditional concepts such as the nuclear family, rejection of illegitimacy, the father as head of the family, and large families as a symbol of success. In other words, the resurgence of Patriarchy. This idea is supported by other facts, such as the best predictor of whether a county voted for Bush or Kerry in 2004 was the TFR of Whites in that county and the overall higher TFR of red states over blue states.

While some protest that Longman and his fellow demographers, social scientists, and pundits are wrong, the evidence seems to refute them. The radical liberalism of the Baby Boomers was based on mass actions of a large number of liberal youth. In the next generations, those liberal youth will have never been born. The staunch feminists of the Second Wave and the Radical movement aren’t having enough children to even replace themselves, let alone grow. These protestors also miss a key point; Longman is a progressive, not a conservative. He views his predictions with dread, but feels compelled to reach the conclusions he does. In fact, many of the scientist predicting a population crash followed by a resurgence of traditionalist religious types share Longman’s dislike of their own results, but find they can reach no others.